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I. INTRODUCTION 
“I was thinking about your plans for a law review article on the 
San Francisco case.1  There may be [sic] some ethical issues . . . . 
You should review Rules of Professional Responsibility 1.6 and 
 
 †  J.D., William Mitchell College of Law, 2002. 
 1. The San Francisco case referred to is State v. Old Republic Title Co., Inc., 
No. 993570 (San Francisco County Court Nov. 9, 2001) [hereinafter Old Republic 
Title].  Old Republic Title dealt with the issue of whether or not a title insurance 
company could legally retain, as additional profits, the interest earned in its 
escrow accounts from property closings it handled for its customers.  Telephone 
Interview with Holly Ness, Research Attorney for Judge Pollock, San Francisco 
County Court (Oct. 29, 2001).  The California District Court for the District of San 
Francisco found that Old Republic Title misappropriated approximately $14 
million dollars from its customers. Id. 
1
Stanchfield: Voting Lock-ups and Sales of Partially Owned Subsidiaries: Can St
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2002
AARON'S PAPER -- FINAL FORMAT 5/23/2002  5:38 PM 
102 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW Vol. 28:-- 
1.9.”2 
This paper is a response to an attack on academic freedom3 
and academic speech.4  The paper reports the author’s encounter 
with a party’s intent to silence rather than permit healthy debate of 
a legal issue,5 by attempting to censor and suppress a proposed 
topic for a law review paper.6  The letter proposing silence7 
contains three related arguments for censoring the proposed topic 
based on the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility, and an 
additional argument based on the confidentiality portion of an 
employee handbook.8  The strongest argument made was that 
writing a paper on a particular legal issue would violate the 
obligation to preserve the confidences and secrets of the former 
client.9  The second Model Rules-based contention for censorship 
of the proposed topic was that the information to be discussed 
throughout the paper would be detrimental to the author’s 
previous employer’s client.10  As to the last rationale given, the 
confidentiality clause will be shown to have no binding effect on 
the author due to the clause’s own language. 
This paper has three inter-related purposes.  First, it will 
 
 2. Letter from Attorney X, Partner, X, Y & Z Law Firm, to Aaron M. Vande 
Linde, Staff, Volume 28 William Mitchell Law Review 1 (Aug. 17, 2001)(on file 
with author)[hereinafter August 17 Letter].  Please note the author felt it 
appropriate to change names so as not to burn any proverbial bridges. 
 3. “The freedom to teach or to learn without . . . interference.” WEBSTER’S 
NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 48 (1986). 
 4. Academic speech encompasses both scholarship and teaching in which 
the author must persuade on the basis of reason and evidence.  J. Peter Byrne, 
Academic Freedom: A “Special Concern of the First Amendment,” 99 YALE L.J. 251, 258 
(1989).  Byrne goes on to state that “academic speech provides our [society’s] 
most important model of expression that is meaningful as well as free, . . . critical 
and inspirational . . . much of its value is social - - it contributes profoundly to 
society at large.” Id. at 261. 
 5. See supra note 1. 
 6. Note that the paper was to fulfill a law review requirement, and only had a 
slight chance for publication. 
 7. “I think it makes more sense for you to consider another topic, than to 
risk ethical issues.” August 17 Letter, supra note 2, at  2. 
 8. X, Y & Z Law Firm, Employee Handbook – Confidentiality, (1999)(on file 
with author) [hereinafter Confidentiality Clause].  The Confidentiality Clause 
states confidential information belongs to the firm and its clients and employees, 
as a condition of employment, who must agree not to divulge or disclose any such 
confidential information. Id. 
 9. August 17 Letter, supra note 2, at 1. 
 10. The vague drafting technique employed in the August 17 Letter, supra 
note 2, caused this author to make an assumption that Attorney X was trying to 
avoid any future litigation against his client. 
2
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introduce the reader to the concept of academic freedom,11 its 
origins, and its growth into a constitutionally protected right.12  
Second, the author will debunk the arguments made in favor of 
censorship – that is, if any reputable legal scholar or practitioner 
would consider vague references to two particular Rules of 
Professional Responsibility13 to be arguments.  Lastly, the paper will 
demonstrate the interaction between academic freedom and 
censorship, and propose a solution to abate a previous employer 
while allowing the author to elevate to higher moral ground.  
Moreover, by engaging in the type of rigorous debate the author 
felt should have been afforded his first topic, the paper will further 
the author’s tutelage in the legal field.14 
II. CENSORSHIP AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM 
The American concept of academic freedom came to fruition 
by way of the American Association of University Professors’ 1915 
General Declaration of Principles.15  The Committee on Academic 
Freedom justified for academic freedom on the basis that the “first 
condition of progress is complete and unlimited freedom to pursue 
inquiry and publish its results.”16 
The scientific method, it was argued, permitted a researcher to 
test theory against fact; to have a successful scientific endeavor is to 
have a free exchange among researchers.17  The Committee further 
believed that “free employment of the scientific method would lead 
to” discovering the independently existing truths of the world.18  
 
 11. See supra note 3. 
 12. See infra text accompanying notes 27-84. 
 13. August 17 Letter, supra note 2, at 1. 
 14. See supra note 1. 
 15. General Report of the Committee on Academic Freedom and Academic 
Tenure, 1 A.A.U.P. BULL. pt. 1, at 15, 17 (1915), reprinted in 2 AMERICAN HIGHER 
EDUCATION: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 860, 874-75 (R. Hofstadter & W. Smith eds., 
1961)[hereinafter 2 AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION].  Pre-Civil War higher 
education curriculum was trained young men in religious piety as preparation for 
the clergy or for the professions of law and medicine. 1828 Report of Yale Faculty, 
reprinted in 1 AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 275 (R. 
Hofstadter & W. Smith eds., 1961)[hereinafter 1 AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION].  
This curriculum consisted mainly of class exercises in the fundamentals of ancient 
language, Greek and Latin, and mathematics – arguably scholarly work lacking in 
any amount of intellectual strife.  F. RUDOLPH, THE AMERICAN COLLEGE AND 
UNIVERSITY 245-48 (1962). 
 16. 2 AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 15, at 867. 
 17. Byrne, supra note 4, at 275-77. 
 18. Id. at 277. 
3
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Hence, the Committee renounced the view that academic freedom 
was a right held by the individual faculty member by determining 
that 
the liberty of the scholar within the university to set forth his 
conclusions, be they what they may, is conditioned by their being 
conclusions gained by a scholar’s method and held in a scholar’s 
spirit; that is to say, the fruits of competent and patient and sincere 
inquiry, and they should be set forth with dignity, courtesy, and 
temperateness of language.19 
Thus, the Committee was not arguing academic speech should 
gain general immunity; it was arguing for an extension of 
autonomy to academic scholars to propose, research and test new 
hypotheses within their respective disciplines.  Effectively, this 
merely confined a scholar’s work to a specialty without abridging 
the scholar’s freedom to strive for new levels of understanding 
within a discipline.20  Still, the Committee felt it necessary for each 
academic to abide by the strictures of the scientific method.  
Constancy of method would produce scientific speech amounting 
to pure knowledge.21  In turn, it follows that a scholar deviating 
from the scientific method “would forfeit the opportunity to master 
the truth.”22 
The concept of academic freedom, whose initial stance was for 
the benefit of the individual professor from interference from the 
institution, was not codified until 1940.23  The determination of the 
American Association of University Professors to do so was based 
on general endorsement within every major higher education 
organization in the nation.24  Academic freedom, it was thought, 
eliminated interference with research and discourse of contentious 
issues and embodied the noble vision of the academic calling — 
the advancement of truth.25  Consequently, “those who are able to 
 
 19. 2 AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 15, at 860. 
 20. See R. MACIVER, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN OUR TIME 6 (1955).  To illustrate, 
MacIver writes, “[A]cademic freedom is . . . a right claimed by the accredited 
educator . . . to interpret his findings and to communicate his conclusions without 
being subjected to any interference . . . because the conclusions are unacceptable 
to some constituted authority within or beyond the institution.”  Id. 
 21. 2 AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 15, at 875. 
 22. Byrne, supra note 4, at 278. 
 23. 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, 64 A.A.U.P. 
BULL. 110 (1978), reprinted in AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFS., POLICY DOCUMENTS & 
REPORTS 3 (1984) [hereinafter AAUP POLICY]. 
 24. Id. at 7-9. 
 25. Walter P. Metzger, Profession and Constitution: Two Definitions of Academic 
4
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 4 [2002], Art. 9
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol28/iss4/9
AARON'S PAPER -- FINAL FORMAT 5/23/2002  5:38 PM 
2002 CENSORSHIP OF LEGAL ACADEMIC SCHOLARSHIP 105 
establish successfully new perspectives in a discipline are likely to 
become its leaders.”26 
A.  Judicial Development of Academic Freedom 
There are two principles that afford legal academic 
scholarship27 protection under the First Amendment;28 first, that 
the speech is political in nature,29 and second that the origin of the 
speech is academic.30  Typically, legal academic scholarship31 
centers on political speech and deserves extraordinary preservation 
under the First Amendment.32  Moreover, legal scholarship is able 
to claim enhanced constitutional protection based on the legal 
community’s commitment to academic freedom.33  Legal academic 
scholarship claims preeminent constitutional protection because of 
its unsurpassed contribution to societal debates in general.  
Furthermore, legal academic scholarship attempts to provide 
society with a careful, self-critical and precise analysis of current 
legal issues.34 
Academic freedom was first espoused by Justice Douglas in his 
 
Freedom in America, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1265, 1276-77 (1988); L. VEYSEY, THE 
EMERGENCE OF THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY 311 (1965). 
 26. Byrne, supra note 4, at 284. 
 27. This amalgamation of words is an attempt to capture the concept of 
knowledge through learning in a legal institution. 
 28. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech . . . .”). 
 29. Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 111 S.Ct. 2720, 2724 (1991) (Kennedy, J., 
joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., in Part I) (stating that a lawyer’s 
political speech which is “critical of the exercise of the State’s power lies at the very 
center of the First Amendment”. 
 30. “Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust.  
Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to 
evaluate . . . otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.”  Sweezy v. New 
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (Warren, C.J., with Black, Douglas and 
Brennan, JJ.). 
 31. See supra note 27. 
 32. “The pros and cons of legislative enactments are clearly discussion or 
dialogue that is highly honored in our First Amendment traditions.”  Pitts. Press 
Co. v. Pitts. Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 398 (1973)(Douglas, J., 
dissenting). 
 33. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978); 
Keyishan v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250; 
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 196-98 (1952)(Frankfurter & Douglas, JJ., 
concurring); Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1951). 
 34. Allan W. Vestal, Former Client Censorship of Academic Scholarship, 43 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1247, 1254 (1992). 
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dissenting opinion in Adler v. Board of Education.35  The majority in 
Adler upheld New York’s Feinberg Law,36 which was a loyalty test for 
public school teachers,37 against a First Amendment challenge by 
New York’s public school teachers.  The Court’s majority opinion 
treated academic freedom as a personal interest to a particular 
teacher.38  Arguing that academic freedom is a social interest, and 
not personal to the instructor, Justices Douglas and Black looked to 
the statute’s educational impact and not merely the effect on an 
individual teacher.39  Justice Douglas argued against the noxious 
nature of the Feinberg Law when describing the law as a “system of 
spying and surveillance.”40  Justices Douglas and Black established 
the First Amendment character of academic freedom by stating 
[w]here suspicion fills the air and holds scholars in line for 
fear of their jobs, there can be no exercise of the free intellect. . . .  
The teacher is no longer a stimulant to adventurous thinking; she 
becomes instead a pipe line for safe and sound information.  A 
deadening dogma takes the place of free inquiry.41 
Justice Douglas never clearly argued in favor of constitutional 
protection for academic freedom; rather, he claimed a situation 
enveloped in suspicion was inconsistent with academic freedom.42  
Justice Douglas further asserted that the Feinberg Law would 
hinder the classroom process – for Justice Douglas, “academic 
freedom denoted an attractive mode of teaching and scholarship 
rather than a legal right.”43 
The Court addressed Oklahoma’s teacher loyalty test in 
Wieman v. Updegraff.44  This time, however, the Court affirmed the 
First Amendment origin of academic freedom and its social 
importance.45  Albeit Justice Frankfurter never specifically used the 
 
 35. 342 U.S. at 510 (Douglas & Black, JJ., dissenting). 
 36. The Adler Court upheld the law on the now-discredited doctrine that 
government can condition public employment on compliance with any pertinent 
condition.  Byrne, supra note 4, at 340 n.147. 
 37. New York’s statute was designed to preclude the employment of anyone 
who belonged to an organization advocating the violent overthrow of the 
government.  Adler, 342 U.S. at 485. 
 38. Id. at 492. 
 39. Id. at 510 (Douglas & Black, JJ., dissenting). 
 40. Id. at 510-11. 
 41. Id. at 510 (emphasis added). 
 42. Id.  At the time, academic freedom was understood as the actual process 
of free inquiry in the classroom.  Byrne, supra note 4, at 290 n.147. 
 43. Byrne, supra note 4, at 290 n.147. 
 44. 344 U.S. 183 (1952). 
 45. Id. at 196-98 (Frankfurter & Douglas, JJ., concurring). 
6
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words “academic freedom,”46 his dynamic writing concerning the 
social value of educators’ freedom to teach, research, and report 
indicated the Court’s future justifications for academic freedom. 
In Sweezy v. New Hampshire,47 the Court reversed the conviction 
of a Marxist48 for refusing to answer the State Attorney General’s 
questions concerning a lecture given at the University of New 
Hampshire.49  The Court based its holding on violations of due 
process rather than infringement of an academic’s First 
Amendment academic freedom rights.50  Never again would the 
Court rely on such an odd doctrine51 to protect academic freedom 
rights.52  However, the plurality opinion approved of constitutional 
limits on the government’s power to interfere with academic 
freedom, stating “[w]e do not now conceive of any circumstance 
wherein a state interest would justify infringement of rights in these 
fields.”53 
 
 46. Id. 
 47. 354 U.S. 234 (1957). 
 48. The Court described Paul Sweezy solely as a journalist.  Id. at 245.  In fact, 
Sweezy was the founder of the left wing magazine Monthly Review.  Byrne, supra 
note 4, at 289, n.139.  Moreover, the Court felt because Sweezy did not occupy a 
university level academic position, the A.A.U.P.’s tradition of academic freedom 
would not insulate Sweezy.  Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 245, 254-55. 
 49. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 245. 
 50. Id. (plurality opinion).  Chief Justice Warren’s opinion held that the New 
Hampshire Attorney General’s questioning violated due process in that New 
Hampshire’s legislature had made a “broad and ill-defined” delegation to the 
Attorney General of the investigative power.  Id. at 254-55. 
 51. It is important to note that the Sweezy decision came down the same day as 
other related opinions all of which made it more difficult for legislative bodies to 
reveal and punish subversive citizens.  See Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957) 
(invalidating the dismissal of an allegedly disloyal State Department employee as 
inconsistent with that department’s procedural guidelines); Watkins v. United 
States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957) (reversing a criminal contempt conviction of a witness 
who refused to answer the House Un-American Activities Committee’s questions 
on the ground that the statutory delegation to the Committee was so vague the 
witness was unable to decide which questions the Committee could compel the 
witness to answer); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 318 (1957) (reversing the 
convictions of Communist Party members for conspiring to violate the Smith Act 
on the ground that the Smith Act only outlawed advocating violent revolution, not 
“teaching forcible overthrow as an abstract principle”). 
 52. Professor Byrne felt the Court’s decision in Sweezy, based on a procedural 
limitation rather than a clear, positive right of academic freedom, reflected the 
Court’s anxiety about abuses found in the McCarthyism investigations or the 
Court’s antipathy to pronounce clear, definitive First Amendment rights.  Byrne, 
supra note 4, at 289. See also Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First 
Amendment Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719, 753 (1975). 
 53. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 251 (plurality opinion). 
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Sweezy’s plurality and concurring opinions contain several 
peculiarities.  To begin with, never before had the Court hinted 
that the First Amendment protected academic freedom.54  
Additionally, Justice Frankfurter relied on non-legal sources to 
describe the content of the right of academic freedom; arguably, 
this was due to the lack of precedent in the area.55  Likewise both 
opinions praise academic freedom “by stressing the social utility of 
free universities.”56  Moreover, both opinions argued that 
continued progress in the nation’s institutions of higher education 
requiring freedom of inquiry and discussion.  Without such 
freedoms afforded to academia, its progress would be impaired, 
which in turn would jeopardize our democratic system of 
government.  Thus government should not interfere with academic 
freedom.57  Sweezy vested new constitutional protections in 
academic freedom through the opinion’s “triumphant rhetoric.”58  
Nonetheless, the Court has restricted academic freedom rights in 
other limited contexts.59 
B.  Two Challenges to the Concept of Academic Freedom 
1.  Court Affirmations of Restrictions to Academic Freedom 
Regardless of the virtues of legal academic scholarship, the 
Supreme Court has affirmed bar regulations circumscribing a legal 
scholar’s First Amendment protections in two particular areas: 
comments made by practicing attorneys involved in pending 
litigation,60 and those regarding the solicitation of commercial 
 
 54. Id. at 262-63 (Frankfurter, J. concurring). 
 55. See supra notes 36-51 and accompanying text. 
 56. Byrne, supra note 4, at 293. 
 57. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250 (plurality opinion); Id. at 261-62 (Frankfurter, J. 
concurring). 
 58. Byrne, supra note 4, at 293. 
 59. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959).  The Barenblatt Court 
affirmed the conviction of an academic for criminal contempt in refusing to 
answer congressional questions concerning communist activities of University of 
Michigan graduate students.  Id.  The Court promised to “always be on the alert 
against intrusion by Congress into this constitutionally protected domain,” but 
emphasized that the university is not a “constitutional sanctuary from inquiry into 
matters that may otherwise be within the constitutional legislative domain . . . .”  Id 
at 112.  Thus, Barenblatt can be seen as a major blow to the protection of academic 
freedom, established just two years earlier in Sweezy. 
 60. In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622 (1958). 
8
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speech.61 
The Sawyer Court addressed the Ninth Circuit’s affirmation of 
the Hawaiian Supreme Court Order62 imposing a one-year 
suspension from practicing law on petitioner.63  The Hawaiian Bar 
charged petitioner with violating the ethical code by making 
speeches and giving interviews regarding a Smith Act trial.64  
Rejecting a mechanical test based on the pendency of litigation 
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, stated an approach 
proposing that lawyers are free to critique the state of the law, but 
limits First Amendment rights where there is an “improper attack 
on [the] administration of justice.”65 
Nevertheless, Justice Stewart warned in his concurrence that 
“[o]bedience to ethical precepts may require abstention from what 
in other circumstances might be constitutionally protected 
speech.”66  Even though the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit 
decision,67 it was clear that the Court foresaw certain situations in 
which the attorney should conform to the ethical principles of his 
or her profession.68 
Thirty-three years later, the Court would take a narrower view 
of Sawyer’s standard.69  In Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada70 the Court 
 
 61. Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991). 
 62. Sawyer, 360 U.S. at 623 (citing In re Sawyer, 41 Haw. 403 (Haw.Terr. 
1956)). 
 63. In re Sawyer, 260 F.2d 189 (9th Cir. 1958). 
 64. United States v. Fujimoto, 107 F. Supp. 865 (D.Haw. 1952).  Petitioner 
Sawyer was the attorney of record for defendants.  One charge related to a speech 
that petitioner gave about six weeks after the trial began regarding the presiding 
judge’s lack of impartiality and fairness in conducting the trial.  Sawyer, 360 U.S. at 
624-25.  The other charge dealt with Sawyer’s interview of a juror after the trial 
ended with a guilty verdict.  Id. at 648 (Frankfurter, Harlan, Clark, and Whittaker, 
JJ., dissenting). 
 65. Sawyer, 360 U.S. at 631, 635. 
 66. Id. at 646-47 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 67. Id. at 640.  The Supreme Court held that the trial record was insufficient 
to support a finding that Sawyer’s out of court speech (at a meeting of the 
International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union, who happened to 
also be her client) during the progress of the trial had impugned the presiding 
judge’s integrity or impartiality.  Id. 
 68. Justice Stewart expressed this underlying precept by stating that “[a] 
lawyer belongs to a profession with inherited standards of propriety and honor, 
which experience has shown necessary for a calling dedicated to the 
accomplishment of justice.”  Id. at 646 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 69. Lawyers are free to criticize the state of the law but with a limitation on a 
lawyer’s First Amendment rights where there is an improper attack on the 
administration of justice. Id. at 635. 
 70. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991). 
9
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was again called on to review another disciplinary proceeding 
regarding attorney speech.71  Writing for the Court in Parts I and II, 
the Chief Justice concluded that the “substantial likelihood of 
material prejudice” test applied by Nevada satisfied the First 
Amendment.72  According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, this test 
strikes a balance between an attorney’s First Amendment right to 
make statements regarding current litigation and the State’s 
interest in fair trials.73  Thus, when the Chief Justice stated “this 
Court’s decisions dealing with lawyer’s First Amendment 
right[s] . . . have balanced the State’s interest in regulating a 
specialized profession against a lawyer’s First Amendment interest 
in the kind of speech at issue,”74 he was merely constricting the First 
Amendment rights of attorneys. 
Regardless of the Chief Justice’s language, the Court did hold 
that Rule 177 was void for vagueness.75  Justice Kennedy, along with 
Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens and O’Connor, deemed the 
safe-harbor language within Rule 17776 to have misled Gentile into 
believing he would not violate any ethical rules by holding a press 
conference.77 
Consequently, the Court’s development of the concept of 
academic freedom since Adler78 and through Gentile79 has generally 
upheld an attorney’s First Amendment rights, and has only sought 
to restrict those rights in the interest of justice.  And more recently 
the Court set forth a balancing test80 requiring state bar associations 
to balance an attorney’s First Amendment rights with the interests 
 
 71. The Nevada Supreme Court found that Dominic Gentile violated Nevada 
Supreme Court Rule 177 which prohibited an attorney from making extrajudicial 
statements to the press that he knows or reasonably should know will have a 
“substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding.” Id. at 
1075 (Rehnquist, C.J., Part III). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id.  Chief Justice Rehnquist goes on to state that the “substantial 
likelihood” test embodied in Rule 177 is constitutional under this analysis for it is 
designed to protect the integrity and fairness of a State’s judicial system, and it 
imposes only narrow and necessary limitations on lawyer’s speech. Id. 
 74. Id. at 1073-76. 
 75. Id. at 1048. 
 76. Rule 177(3) provides that a lawyer “may state without elaboration . . . the 
general nature of the . . . defense . . . notwithstanding subsection 1 and 2(a-f).” Id. 
 77. Id.  The Court went on to state that “absent any clarifying interpretation 
by the state court, the Rule fails to provide fair notice to those to whom it is 
directed.” Id. (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 112 (1972)). 
 78. 342 U.S. 485, 510 (1951)(Douglas & Black, JJ., dissenting). 
 79. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991). 
 80. See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text. 
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of the state during disciplinary actions concerning out-of-court 
speech by an attorney.  As such, it is apparent that the Court has 
struck the appropriate symmetry between its desire to protect the 
freedoms necessary for meaningful scholarship and the state’s right 
to restrict those rights under certain circumstances. 
2.  Ethical Regulations to Academic Freedom 
Additionally, a second challenge to the academic freedom 
protections for legal academic scholarship is that the ethical 
regulations typically invoked are subject-oriented regulations, not 
content-oriented.81  In this author’s particular situation, censorship 
was directed at non-confidential, generally known information, 
which the author was exposed to during the course of 
employment.82 
A broad reading of Ethical Code 4-583 would bar legal scholars 
and legal academics from participating in public policy debates on 
issues with which both, arguably, have knowledge and expertise.  
An obvious conclusion is that EC 4-5 is a content-based regulation 
based on the language that “authorities must . . . examine the 
content of the message that is conveyed”84 in order to determine if 
a violation of EC 4-5 occurred. 
As applied to this author’s previous dilemma, the censorial 
former employer proclaimed that “the client will be upset . . . no 
matter what slant you put on it.”85  In effect, this meant the former 
employer and its client wished to keep the specific legal issue below 
the proverbial radar screen for as long as possible.Consequently, 
one is able to easily discern that, although a lawyer’s freedom of 
speech is not favored in all situations,86 in cases concerning 
academic scholarship, whatever its source, the First Amendment 
 
 81. Vestal, supra note 34, at 1256. 
 82. The Model Rules permit a lawyer [and arguably legal scholar] to use 
information relating to a former client that is in the “public domain.”  MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.1.9(c)(1)(2001) (emphasis added) [hereinafter 
PROF’L CONDUCT].  However, “a lawyer [legal scholar] should not use information 
acquired in the course of the representation of a client to the disadvantage of the 
client.”  MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-5 (1981) [hereinafter PROF’L 
RESP.]. 
 83. PROF’L RESP., supra note 82.  Note that Minnesota replaced the Model 
Code of Professional Responsibility with the ABA Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct. 
 84. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 383 (1983). 
 85. August 17 Letter, supra note 2, at 2. 
 86. See supra text accompanying notes 59-82. 
11
Stanchfield: Voting Lock-ups and Sales of Partially Owned Subsidiaries: Can St
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2002
AARON'S PAPER -- FINAL FORMAT 5/23/2002  5:38 PM 
112 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW Vol. 28:-- 
secures a lawyer, legal scholar or academician his or her academic 
freedom rights. 
III. ONE’S DUTY TO MAINTAIN CLIENT CONFIDENCES 
“A lawyer [legal scholar] shall not reveal information relating 
to representation of a client unless the client consents after 
consultation[. . .]”87  The reference to this rule88 implied that 
writing a paper, with a possibility of publication, would 
inappropriately disclose client confidences and/or secrets.89 
The retort to this rationale is elementary.  The previous paper 
topic90 would not disclose any client confidences91 or secrets92 as 
defined.93  Which, in turn, begs the question, how a court would 
rule if a would-be officious intervenor invoked Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct 1.6 and 1.9 to censor a proposed piece of 
legal academic scholarship?94 
 
 87. PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 82, at 1.6(a) (emphasis added). The 
comments explain further that “[t]he confidentiality rule applies not merely to 
matters communicated in confidence by the client but also to all information 
relating to the representation, whatever its source.”  Id. at cmt. 6. 
 88. August 17 Letter, supra note 2. 
 89. Id.  Again, The point must be stressed that since the former employer 
chose to make vague references – arguably, an attempt to blur the specific charge 
– the author has had to make assumptions as to the particular language and 
charge leveled. 
 90. See supra note 1. 
 91. Client confidences are “information protected by the attorney-client 
privilege under applicable law[.]” PROF’L RESP., supra note 82, at DR 4-101(A) 
(emphasis added). 
 92. Secrets are “other information gained in the professional relationship 
that the client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be 
embarrassing or would likely be detrimental to the client.”  Id.  Note that the 
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct “eliminate[d] the two-pronged duty under the 
Model Code of Prof’l Responsibility in favor of a single standard protecting all 
information about a client ‘relating to the representation.’” PROF’L CONDUCT, 
supra note 82, at Model Code Comparison cmt. 1. 
 93. To provide the reader with a basis for this statement, I note that the initial 
twelve pages of text to the first topic contained citations to the following: two 
Federal statutes; three Arizona statutes; two California statutes; three Minnesota 
statutes; one Arizona case; one California case; one Texas case; one Washington 
case; as well as references to legal encyclopedias and legal dictionaries.  The 
former client is neither mentioned nor analogized to in the first paper. Aaron M. 
Vande Linde, Interest Earned in Escrow Accounts: An Escrow Agent’s Profits or Not? 
(Aug. 2001) (incomplete, unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
 94. “I doubt that a physician who broadcast the confidential disclosures of his 
patients could rely on the constitutional right of free speech to protect him from 
professional discipline.”  In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 646 (1959)(Stewart, J. 
concurring). 
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Since the type of speech involved was political in nature,95 the 
regulation may be challenged as vague96 and overbroad.97  One 
authority believes censorship of “all information relating to the 
representation”98 is overbroad “absent any requirement that 
disclosure of the information have an associated harm.”99  
Considering the previous paper topic contained no confidences or 
secrets, why would the author’s former employer seek to censor the 
research, writing and possible publication of a legal issue?  Two 
rationales are readily apparent. 
A.  Preservation of Client Confidences 
1.  Duty of Confidentiality 
The preservation of client confidences is a real concern for 
practitioners.  The duty of confidentiality is grounded in 
evidentiary law’s attorney-client privilege.100  This privilege arose in 
the seventeenth century as an outgrowth of the general principle 
that to reveal another’s confidences was dishonorable.101  Later in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the reasoning shifted to 
the proper functioning of the legal system as a whole.  The 
attorney-client privilege, in its traditional form, holds that: 
(1) where legal advise of any kind is sought (2) from a 
professional legal adviser in his/her capacity as such, (3) the 
communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence 
(5) by the client, (6) are at his/her instance permanently protected 
(7) from disclosure by him/herself or by the legal adviser, (8) 
 
 95. Vestal, supra note 34, at 1260-61 (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 
432 (1963)). 
 96. The vagueness doctrine originated in the 14th Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, and is a basis for striking down legislation 
containing insufficient warning of what conduct is unlawful.  Connally v. Gen. 
Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)(stating that a law is unconstitutionally vague 
when people “of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning”). 
 97. The overbreadth doctrine serves to invalidate legislation, which regulates 
more speech than the Constitution allows to be regulated. Schad v. Borough of 
Mt. Emphraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (stating that a law whose aim was to prohibit 
nude dancing, but actually prohibited all live entertainment, was overbroad). 
 98. PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 82, at cmt. 6. 
 99. Vestal, supra note 34, at 1261. 
 100. DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY – ETHICS BY THE 
PERVASIVE METHOD 223 (2d ed. 1998). 
 101. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ETHICS AND THE PRACTICE OF LAW 58-62 (1978). 
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except [if] the protection be waived.102 
2.  Preservation of Individual Rights 
A second justification for confidentiality is that an overarching 
objective of our legal system is the preservation of individual rights.  
Our legal system requires its participants to seek attorney assistance 
so as to protect a client’s legal interests.  It is a self-evident truth 
that unless clients feel free to provide all relevant information an 
attorney cannot provide adequate representation for the client.103  
An assurance of confidentiality seemingly injects trust into the 
attorney client relationship.  This trust allows a client to openly 
consult with an attorney and disclose key facts, which could be 
legally helpful to the client.  Thus, without a duty of confidentiality 
enmeshed in our legal system, a client likely would be overly 
cautious in revealing information, which would in turn deprive a 
client from the effective assistance of counsel.104 
Likewise, a duty of confidentiality allows clients facing criminal 
prosecution to fully exercise their Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel105 and their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.106  Whereupon an attorney could be compelled to 
reveal confidential information, a client’s reliance on one 
constitutional guarantee effectively would compromise the other 
guarantee.107 
Nonetheless, the broad scope of our current confidentiality 
rules does have its critics.  One such critique asserts that the 
elementary priorities found in the traditional confidentiality 
rationale are “perverse” because those priorities favor clients who 
withhold information out of irresponsible motives at the expense of 
innocent third parties.108  Moreover, riddled throughout the 
 
 102. John S. Dzienkowski, Lawyers as Intermediaries: The Representation of Multiple 
Clients, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 741, 784 (1992); John P. Frowe, The Legal Ethics of Louis 
Brandeis, 17 STAN. L. REV. 683, 702 (1965). 
 103. HAZARD, supra note 101, at 69. 
 104. State v. Williams, 207 N.W.2d 98, 104 (Iowa 1967) (defining effective 
assistance of counsel as “conscientious, meaningful representation wherein 
accused is advised of his rights and honest, learned and able counsel is given a 
reasonable opportunity to perform the task assigned”). 
 105. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 106. Id. at amend. V. 
 107. RHODE, supra note 100, at 226. 
 108. Id. at 227 (citing Klemm v. Superior Court, 142 Cal. Rptr. 509, 512 
(1977)). 
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current Code109 are numerous exceptions to confidentiality,110 
which erode the duty to maintain confidences.  Hence a review of 
the common law rationale of confidentiality is needed. 
3.  Two common law rules of confidentiality 
Turning to the law of agency111 the most applicable rule states: 
[u]nless otherwise agreed, after the termination of the agency 
the agent: . . . (b) has a duty to the principal not to use or disclose 
to third persons trade secrets, . . . or other similar confidential 
matters given to him only for the principal’s use[.]  The agent is 
entitled to use general information concerning the . . . business of the 
principal . . . if not acquired in violation of his duty as agent[.]112 
An argument for censorship based upon this provision113 is 
unpersuasive, however, for three reasons. 
First, section 396(b)’s language limits its application to “trade 
secrets . . . or other similar confidential matters”114 and does not 
include non-confidential, non-secret, public-domain information.115  
Second, section 396(b) contains a specific entitlement for the 
former agent to use “general information concerning the method 
of business of the principal.”116  Third, an agent’s obligation under 
section 396 “is directed to ‘commercial activity and competition 
between rival businesses,’”117 and not to the type of public policy debate 
involved in a law review article. 
The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers118 provides 
 
 109. PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 82. 
 110. Id. at 1.6(a), 1.6(b)(1)(2), 1.9(c)(1); see also DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID 
LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 495-96 (2d ed. 1995). 
 111. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY (1957). 
 112. Id. at § 396 (emphasis added). 
 113. Note, this argument was not made in the August 17 Letter; its inclusion in 
this paper is to fully analyze the duty of confidentiality from numerous 
perspectives. 
 114. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY: USING CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION 
AFTER TERMINATION OF AGENCY § 396(b)(1957). 
 115. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 116. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY: USING CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION 
AFTER TERMINATION OF AGENCY § 396(b) (1957). 
 117. Penguin Books USA, Inc. v. Walsh, 756 F. Supp. 770, 786 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) 
(rejecting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 396(b) and (c) as grounds for 
censoring book on the Iran-Contra Affair by former associate counsel with Office 
of Independent Counsel), appeal dismissed, vacating as moot and remanding with 
direction to dismiss, 929 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 118. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (2000).  Unlike 
the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the Model Code of 
15
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specific guidance for the legal community regarding 
confidentiality.  Section 60 proposes a general duty to safeguard 
client confidences in that “during and after representation of a 
client: (a) the lawyer may not use or disclose confidential client 
information . . . if there is a reasonable prospect that doing so will 
adversely affect a material interest of the client . . . .”119 
Client information is confidential when it consists of 
information regarding a client or the client’s matter contained in 
documents, or other communiqués, “other than information that is 
generally known.”120  The initial drafters provided further 
clarification of the duty of confidentiality in the official comments 
to sections 111 and 112.121  The comments give further guidance on 
when information becomes “generally known.”122  And the 
comments give special treatment to “generally known information 
about the law that a lawyer derives from representing clients.”123  It 
follows, consequently, that what a lawyer acquires into his or her 
legal knowledge base through experience, research, scholarship 
and the like becomes the lawyer’s to “employ for the benefit of all 
clients, for law reform efforts, or for the lawyer’s personal use” 124 
such as writing. 
 
Professional Responsibility, the Restatement is not a set of regulations.  Rather, the 
Restatement is a series of principles (or “black letter rules”) going beyond the 
ethics rules to cover other areas affecting the practice of law (e.g., vicarious 
liability, tort doctrines relating to malpractice, and attorney-client evidentiary 
privilege). 
 119. Id. at § 60. 
 120. Id. at § 59 (emphasis added). 
 121. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 111, 112 (Tentative 
Draft No. 3, 1988).  The definition of confidential client information includes 
information and communications that were not strictly private in nature when the 
lawyer first received them.  It also may apply to information that originates in strict 
secrecy but then becomes known by others . . . so long as the information does not 
become generally known.”  Id.  (emphasis added) 
 122. Id. at cmt. e.  The American Law Institute designated information as 
generally known “when the information is so public that a person interested in 
knowing the information could obtain it . . . without special knowledge or 
substantial difficulty or expense.” Id. 
 123. Id. at cmt. f.  This comment excludes from the definition of confidential 
client information generally known information about the law that a lawyer, or 
legal scholar, derives from representing clients.  It further states that “[s]uch 
information becomes part of the general set of skills and fund of information 
possessed by the lawyer . . . Unlike other kinds of generally known information . . . 
information about the law is to be considered generally known. . .”  Id. (emphasis added). 
 124. Id. at cmt. f. 
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B.  Contrasting the need for a free flow of information 
A direct consequence of the first rationale favoring censorship 
is practitioners would not seek a free flow of information and 
would not carefully parse a piece of legislation to provide for such a 
free flow of information.  “Practitioners [thus] tend to ignore the 
precise rules in this area, and opt for secrecy if there is any issue of 
confidentiality.”125  On the other hand, legal academics desire the 
freest exchange of information, and delve deep for substantive 
direction from the guiding principles as to what is and is not 
permissible.126  While a legal scholar may be immune to the 
practitioner’s concerns for commercial gain, the scholar does have 
a critical stake in the freest exchange of information, and thus will 
focus earnestly on the particular rules to determine whether or not 
the rules permit disclosure. 
The vague reference to the Rules of Professional Conduct127 
indicates a lack of concern with whether or not the referenced rule 
actually prohibited this author’s actions.  Was it thought that 
leveling an ethical violation against a legal scholar would be 
dispositive without further debate?  The author could only 
speculate and refuses to do so here.  Considering the former 
employer claimed confidential status of the information, though it 
has been shown to be otherwise, i.e. information in the public 
domain, the rules would permit disclosure.128 
IV. DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION DETRIMENTAL TO A FORMER 
CLIENT 
“A lawyer [legal scholar] . . . whose present or former firm has 
formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter: (1) 
use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage 
of the former client[.]”129  “You learned about the San Francisco 
case . . . while doing research for a client . . . ; a law review article 
 
 125. Vestal, supra note 34, at 1261. 
 126. Upon receiving the August 17 Letter, the author immediately consulted 
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, and within three to four days amassed 
numerous decisions and articles regarding the issues presented in the August 17 
Letter. 
 127. August 17 Letter, supra note 2, at 1; PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 82, at 
1.6. 
 128. PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 82, at 1.9(c)(1). 
 129. Id. 
17
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on the topic is likely to have an adverse effect on the client. . .”130  
The response to this line of reasoning is three-fold. 
A.  Generally Known Information 
First, the rationale that Rule 1.9131 requires silence of any 
information damaging to the former client is simply wrong.  A 
plain reading of the Rule distinctly permits disclosure of generally 
known information.132  A prerequisite, when analyzing Rule 
1.9(c)(1) must be to establish what the drafters meant by the term 
of art “generally known.”  The sole guidance given by the drafters is 
analogous to information found in the “public domain.”133  Delving 
further, an organic meaning of public domain is found in the 
tenets of copyright law, setting forth public ownership status of 
writings, publications and the like not protected by copyrights.134  
Likewise, the “fair use” doctrine135 establishes that scholarship and 
research is not an infringement of a valid copyright.  “Generally 
known,” as stated in the Code,136 thus encompasses information 
devoid of copyright protection found in the public sphere. 
Turning to the issue presented, the first paper’s topic and 
 
 130. August 17 Letter, supra note 2, at 1. 
 131. PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 82, at 1.9(c)(1). 
 132. Id. (stating “[a] lawyer who has formerly represented a client . . . shall not 
thereafter: (1) use information relating to the representation . . . except . . . when the 
information has become generally known. . .”  (emphasis added)).  See also discussion 
supra Part III.A and text accompanying notes 107-114. 
 133. PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 82, at 1.9(c)(1) Model Code Comparison 
cmt. 3 (stating, “it is a necessity to define when a lawyer may make use fo 
information about a client after the client-lawyer relationship has terminated”).  
While there was no termination of the client-lawyer relationship, there was a 
termination of an employment relationship—the author resigned his position to 
accept other employment.  Thus, because of a termination of the employment 
relationship and even though the author’s position was that of a law clerk, the 
client-lawyer relationship ended with regards to the author’s involvement with his 
former employer’s client. 
 134. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (1976); see generally EDMUND W. KITCH & HARVEY S. 
PERLMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 396-98 (discussing the 
nature of ownership rights to published works under copyright law). 
 135. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (1976).  This doctrine balances the author’s traditional 
ownership rights with First Amendment values allowing for criticism and 
comment, and scholarly use.  To balance these equities, one must look to the 
following: 
(1) purpose and character of use (i.e. is the use commercial or educational in 
nature?); (2) nature of copyrighted work; (3) amount and substantiality of portion 
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) effect of the use. Id. 
 136. PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 82, at 1.9(c)(1). 
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information137 became generally known prior to the initial research 
and formulation of a position on the legal issue.138  Moreover, even 
if copyright law deemed the information protected, research and 
scholarly comment of the information would not infringe the 
copyright.139  Hence, no duty to maintain confidences so as to avoid 
detriment to the former client existed upon mental conception of 
the first topic.  The rationale is, arguably, once confidential 
information becomes public, no disclosure of confidential 
information by an attorney could cause a detriment because any 
detriment occurred when the information became public 
knowledge.140  The duty to maintain potentially detrimental 
confidences should have no application if the information is 
generally known.  Therefore, the expansionist reading141 of Rule 
1.9(c)(1) is not a reasonable reading, and is not supported in the 
field of legal ethics.142 
B.  Information as Property 
Second, censorship would be improper based on a client 
claiming information as property.  The former employer asserted 
that learning of a legal issue while doing research for the client 
supports the notion that the client holds a property interest in the 
 
 137. See supra text accompanying note 1. 
 138. Old Republic Title Must Pay $17 Million to Customers, L.A. TIMES, May 12, 
2001, at C2; Jim Herron Zamora, Old Republic Fined Additional $15 million / Title 
company to Pay Damages in Fraud Case, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., June 12, 2001, at C2.  
See generally Robert C. Farrell, Limited Practice Officers and Admission to Practice Rule 
12: Taking or Not?, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 735 (2000) (discussing typical escrow 
transactions and Washington’s treatment of limited practice officers with regards 
to escrow transactions); John C. Murray, Insured Closings: Title Company Agents and 
Approved Attorneys, 456 P.L.I. REAL ESTATE 1161, 1173-75 (2000) (discussing the 
information borrowers and lenders need to know in today’s market); Michael C. 
Patton & Robert W. Sargeant, Recent Developments in Title Insurance Law, 35 TORT & 
INS. L.J. 639, 647-50 (1999)(discussing court treatment of agent malfeasance in the 
title insurance context). 
 139. See supra note 134. 
 140. Cf. L. RAY PATTERSON, LAWYER’S LAW: PROCEDURAL, MALPRACTICE AND 
DISCIPLINARY ISSUES 129-32 (4th ed. 1998). 
 141. Preventing a legal scholar from using public domain information in legal 
academic scholarship to which he or she was exposed during the course of private 
employment.  See August 17 Letter, supra note 2, at 1. 
 142. See generally OLAVI MARU, DIGEST OF BAR ASSOCIATION ETHICS OPINIONS ¶ 
1536 (1970) (N.J. 49 (Op. 50)) (differentiating between an attorney who discloses 
“information which is a matter of public record” to a research firm compiling 
information, and “confidential information” which an attorney may reveal only 
with client permission). 
19
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knowledge gained.143  This extraordinary position is specious at 
best, and is in direct conflict with the Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility. 
Similarly, Canon 8144 provided that “[a] lawyer should assist in 
improving the legal system.”145  This statement is premised on the 
fact that “lawyers are uniquely qualified to make significant 
contributions to the improvement of the legal system.”146  
Additionally, the commentary asserts that 
[b]y reason of education and experience, lawyers are especially 
qualified to recognize deficiencies in the legal system and to 
initiate corrective measures therein.  Thus they [lawyers] should 
participate in proposing and supporting legislation and programs 
to improve the system, without regard to the general interests or desires of 
clients or former clients.147 
The essence of this issue then is whether the experience 
gained by the attorney becomes the property of the client or the 
property of the attorney.  A straightforward and definitive answer is 
found in Canon 8; an attorney’s experiences are not a former 
client’s property.148  In fact, legal scholars and attorneys also have 
an ethical obligation to society at large to research and comment 
via legal academic scholarship for changes in the law.149 
Likewise, the former employer’s proposed position of 
censorship cuts against the grain of Canon 7.150  An attorney or 
legal scholar’s loyalty obligation to a former client “implies no 
obligation to adopt a personal viewpoint favorable to the interests 
or desires of [the] client. . . . [an attorney or legal scholar] may take 
positions on public issues and espouse legal reforms . . . without regard to 
the individual view of any client.”151 
 
 143. August 17 Letter, supra note 2, at 1.  Effectively, the former employer, on 
behalf of its client, claimed a property interest in a legal issue presented to a 
California court.  See supra note 1. 
 144. PROF’L RESP., supra note 82.  Please note that the Model Code of 
Professional Responsibility retains only persuasive weight with respect to the 
author’s situation due to Minnesota’s enactment of the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at EC 8-8. 
 147. Id. at EC 8-1 (emphasis added). 
 148. Id. at Canon 8. 
 149. Id. at EC 8-2 (providing that “[i]f a lawyer believes that the . . . absence of 
a rule of law . . . contributes to an unjust result, he [or she] should endeavor by 
lawful means to obtain appropriate changes in the law”). 
 150. See id. at Canon 7. 
 151. Id. at EC 7-17 (emphasis added). 
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C.  Treatment within Restatement of Law Governing Lawyers 
The Restatement addresses the issues of whether a lawyer, or 
legal scholar, can take a position on a public policy question 
adverse to a former client.152  “A lawyer may publicly take personal 
positions on controversial issues without regard to whether the 
positions are consistent with those of some or all of the lawyer’s 
clients[.]”  The public policy discussion of the proposed topic, 
which was the target of the former employer’s censorship, is clearly 
applicable in this instance.153 
The idiosyncrasies in approach, the practitioners’client-centric 
focus and the academicians’public policy-centered focus, are 
clearly demonstrated in the Restatement discussion above.  
Focusing on client representation and starting with the opinion 
that maintaining client secret’s is the primary goal, “it is easy to 
assume that there should be a common law duty not to use any 
information from a representation, even non-confidential, public 
domain information, to the detriment of [a] client.”154  In the 
alternative, by focusing on public policy debates the “non-
confidential, public domain character of information becomes 
dispositive, not the fact that the lawyer was serving a client when 
exposed to the information.”155  Consequently, a legal scholar 
retains any experience gained during the course of employment as 
his or her personal property, and is free to research, analyze, and 
advocate for changes in the law without any apprehension of 
violating the ethical considerations of the legal profession. 
V. CONFIDENTIALITY CLAUSE CONSIDERED, BUT DISMISSED 
While it has already been established that no confidential duty 
existed as to the information to be used,156 It is still necessary to 
refute the final argument in favor of censorship.  That argument 
 
 152. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS: LAWYER OPENLY EXPRESSING 
PUBLIC POLICY VIEWS INCONSISTENT WITH CLIENT POSITIONS § 114 (Tentative Draft 
No. 3, 1988). 
 153. Once again, I stress that the proposed topic was not only addressing a 
novel issue in the law; it was to afford a legal scholar with an opportunity to engage 
in an in-depth analysis of the issue and propose a framework for analysis should 
the issue present itself to a Minnesota court. 
 154. Vestal, supra note 34, at 1292. 
 155. Id. at 1293. 
 156. The information has been shown to be “generally known information” 
and information within the “public domain” and as such, no confidential duty 
exists. See supra Parts III., IV. 
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being – “you must keep the information that you learned as an 
employee of the firm confidential.”157 
A.  Confidentiality Clause 
“As a result of . . . employment . . . you will . . . have access to 
confidential information . . . . As a condition of employment, you 
must agree that . . . you will not at any time divulge or disclose . . . 
any such information, whether or not it has been designated 
specifically as ‘confidential’ or ‘attorney work product.’”158  This is 
the language the former employer now relies upon to censor a 
proposed law review paper.  In order to determine the effectiveness 
of the clause, it is necessary to parse its language and analyze it 
against the backdrop of current Minnesota case law. 
First, the language of the former employer’s confidentiality 
clause signifies the boundaries of the confidential duty imposed 
upon its employees.  The clause begins by presenting an employee 
with an ambiguous definition of what the firm considers to be 
confidential,159 and conditions employment on the employee’s 
agreement not to divulge or disclose such information.  The 
confidentiality clause goes on to incorporate Minnesota Rules of 
Professional Conduct 1.6 into the agreement, and requires an 
employee’s strict adherence to Rule 1.6.160  The clause does not set 
forth any duty to maintain client confidences after termination or 
resignation.  The clause’s language - “[a]s a condition of your 
employment,” “except in the responsible exercise of your job,” and 
“[a]ll employees” – establishes that the confidential duty only 
applies to its then current employees.  The purview of the clause 
itself thus has no binding effect on an employee who has resigned 
his/her post at the firm. 
The drafters signaled their resolve that employees maintain 
confidences by including the confidentiality requirements of Rule 
1.6 on its employees and calling for strict adherence to that Rule.  
 
 157. August 17 Letter, supra note 2. 
 158. Confidentiality Clause, supra note 8. 
 159. The Confidentiality Clause provides its definition of confidential 
information by way of a seemingly non-exhaustive list of confidential matters.  Id. 
 160. Id.  Rule 1.6 “Confidentiality of Information” mandates that an attorney 
shall not reveal confidential client information unless the client consents after 
consultation, or the attorney has a reasonable belief that revealing such 
information will prevent bodily harm, or the attorney reasonably believes is 
necessary to establish a claim or defense in an action between the attorney and 
client. PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 82, at 1.6. 
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However, the drafters failed to utilize language that extends the 
confidential duty to former employees.  Only the language of the 
clause itself can show the drafters’ intent, and this language fails to 
continue the duty found in Rule 1.9.161  Without direct evidence of 
the drafters’ intent to extend the confidential duty, one cannot 
surmise the drafters meant to charge former employees with an 
extended duty of confidentiality. 
Moreover, the grammatical structure of the clause negates a 
finding that the language “you will not at any time divulge or 
disclose”162 prolongs a former employee’s duty to maintain 
confidences.  Because the language is framed in the terms “[a]s a 
condition of employment,” the clause limits itself to the duration of 
an employee’s stint with a firm.  One might protest that this is 
solely a semantic exercise, allowing the author another avenue to 
breach one of the sacred tenets—duty of confidentiality—of the 
legal profession.  However,  the lessons of statutory construction 
mandate every word has meaning within the statute and no word is 
superfluous.163  Accordingly, the intent of the confidentiality clause 
must be determined by the plain language of the clause and within 
the bounds of its grammatical structure; construing the clause any 
other way demonstrates a general lack of understanding in contract 
interpretation. 
B.  Minnesota Case Law Applied to a Hypothetical Situation 
Turning now to a hypothetical situation: if the proposed paper 
had actually been written,164 could the former employer rely on its 
confidentiality clause to censor the proposed paper topic? 
Minnesota courts carefully scrutinize restrictive covenants 
when determining enforceability because the covenants limit an 
employee’s ability to work and earn a living.  As such, restrictive 
 
 161. This position assumes that once an employee resigns his/her position 
with a firm, the firm’s clients become the former employee’s former clients.  
PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 82, at 1.9.  Even though the former employee was not 
in fact an attorney, the former employee possesses the confidential client 
information intimated to in Rule 1.9.  Thus one is able to conclude that the duty 
to avoid conflicts with former clients extends to a firm’s former employees. 
 162. Confidentiality Clause, supra note 8. 
 163. Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961) (stating that a word 
“gathers meaning from the words around it”).  See also ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER 
OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997) (arguing against the use 
of legislative history as an interpretive tool). 
 164. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
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covenants are generally looked upon with disfavor.165  Minnesota 
courts have further held that a restrictive covenant “must not 
impose any greater restriction on the employee than is necessary to 
protect the employer’s business.”166  167 As applied to this author’s 
previous situation, the following queries need be resolved. 
First, did the confidentiality clause impair the author’s ability 
to work in the legal field and earn a living?  At first glance, the 
answer is no.  The author was engaged in writing and research to 
fulfill a law review requirement, and by itself this would not appear 
to limit one’s earning potential.  Despite the initial appearance, 
one can argue that indeed the author’s ability to work and earn 
income was impaired.  On account of the former employer’s 
censorial position, the author had reason to cease work on the 
initial paper, ascertain whether or not the censorial position had 
merit, and act accordingly.  To do so required the author’s time, 
and thus diverted the author’s attention from new job 
responsibilities as well as detracting from the author’s adequate 
class preparation.  Reducing the amount of time the author could 
spend on class preparation clearly will have a correlation to an 
ability to earn an income as an attorney; without above average 
grades a law school graduate is behind the proverbial eight ball in 
the job market. 
Second, does the confidentiality clause impose a greater 
restriction than is necessary to protect the employer’s business?  
That is, is the clause reasonable?  In analyzing the confidentiality 
clause’s reasonableness, the court would consider the nature and 
character of the employment, nature and extent of the business, 
the time frame in which the restriction is imposed, and balance 
should be struck between the interests of the employer and the 
employee.168 
It is easily shown that the clause is for the protection of client 
confidences and general firm information, arguably a reasonable 
goal.  Regardless, as previously explained, the clause’s reach does 
not extend to former employees.169  If a reviewing court were not 
initially to find the truth in the previous sentence, it would need to 
 
 165. E.g., Bennett v. Storz Broadcasting Co., 134 N.W.2d 892, 898 (Minn. 
1965). 
 166. Id. at 899.  In like manner, the Minnesota courts validate restrictive 
covenants when it is necessary to protect the employer’s business.  Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Dynamic Air, Inc. v. Bloch, 502 N.W.2d 796, 799 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993). 
 169. See supra Part V.A. 
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toil in its determination of reasonableness.  The nature and 
character of employment and nature of business are directly 
correlative, and should not be thought of as two distinct areas.170  
The clause contains no time limitation for maintaining confidential 
information.171  In order to strike a balance between these two 
competing forces, a court may necessarily have to “blue pencil a 
covenant, that is, to modify so as to render it reasonable and 
enforceable.”172  To do so the court would have to engage in 
judicial paternalism, which courts typically are not inclined to do.  
Nonetheless, a reasonable solution could have been reached by 
allowing the former employee, your author, to write a paper on the 
proposed topic with the understanding that the paper need be 
devoid of any confidential information.  In spite of the 
aforementioned reasonable solution, no charge was brought to 
enforce the confidentiality clause and the only solution proposed 
was that your author substitute the first topic with another. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The vague reasoning in favor of censorship set forth by the 
former employer was insufficient.  The argument calling for the 
author to uphold his duty to maintain client confidences and 
secrets has been shown to have no application to information that 
has become generally known.  Moreover, its own language 
disproved the specific rule cited by the former employer.173  
Secondly, the detriment to the former client argument also fell 
victim to its own language, and appears to be flatly contrary to 
established authority.  Lastly, the confidentiality agreement was 
shown to have no application by the very nature of the instrument 
itself.  Yet it is somehow a scant outcome by honestly establishing 
that the arguments for censorship are vacuous and unconvincing.  
What remains galling is that the issue would even arise in the first 
place.  Regardless of the fallacies shown in the censors position, the 
author decided to shift long paper topics based on the Golden 
 
 170. The nature and character of the employment was legal research and 
writing; the firm utilized this research and writing to provide clients with 
memorandum of law addressing novel legal areas. 
 171. Confidentiality Clause, supra note 8. 
 172. Dynamic Air, 502 N.W.2d at 800 (citing Bess v. Bothman, 257 N.W.2d 791, 
794-95 (Minn. 1977)). 
 173. PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 82, at 1.7. 
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Rule—do unto others as you would have them do onto you.174 
Long ago, one academic rejoiced and celebrated in the 
thought that the “principle of fear has been almost wholly banished 
from systems of education” as well as learning had become 
recognized “as an independent interest of the community.”175  And 
today the principle that “the scholar is especially encouraged to 
participate in the public forum”176 should once again ring true. 
 
 
 174. “In everything, therefore, treat people the same way you want them to 
treat you, for this is the Law and the Prophets.” Matthew 7:12 (NEW AMERICAN 
STANDARD BIBLE 2000). 
 175. 2 JOSIAH QUINCY, THE HISTORY OF HARVARD 445-46 (1977).  Quincy went 
on to conclude by asserting that attempts were being made “to rescue the general 
mind from the vassalage in which it has been held by sects of the church, and by 
parties in the state; giving to that interest . . . a vitality of its own, having no 
precarious dependence . . . on subserviency to particular views[.]” Id. 
 176. Borris I. Bittker, Developments in the Law – Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. 
REV. 1045, 1048 (1968). 
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